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TOWARDS SECURITY, PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

THE STATE OF PLAY IN SAFE
AND SECURE MANAGEMENT
OF AMMUNITION

GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)
The GICHD is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, cluster
munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with mine action
organisations and other human security organisations. We support the ultimate
goals of mine action: saving lives, returning land to productive use and promoting
development. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around
65 staff members from over 19 different countries. This makes the GICHD a unique
and international centre of mine action expertise and knowledge. Our work is made
possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than
30 governments and organisations.
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INTRODUCTION, SCOPE
AND METHODOLOGY

Unplanned explosions of poorly managed munitions sites often result in a high
number of people being killed, injured or displaced. Such sites present a global
risk with more than half of the countries of the world having experienced incidents
since 1979.1 Following a peak in 2011 with 37 reported incidents, the trend is still
high with more than one incident a month in 2017.2

UNPLANNED EXPLOSIONS AT MUNITIONS SITES, 1979 – 2017

FIGURE 1
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The humanitarian impact is most visible in terms of casualties: an average of more
than 800 casualties per year, over 35 years (from 1979 to 2013).3 Such impact
tends to be much higher when sites are located in populated areas,4 as illustrated
by the multiple explosions at the Mpila ammunition depots in a heavily populated
area of Congo-Brazzaville in 2011, resulting in 300 killed, 2,500 injured and 121,000
made homeless. Further to the human toll, the socio-economic consequences of
such explosions can be significant. For the incident in Congo-Brazzaville, they were
partially estimated at US$ 672 million.5 The costs of repairing the damage tend to
be far greater than preventive and effective stockpile management procedures.6
As an example, the Gërdec explosion in Albania in 2008 resulted in estimated
socio-economic and clean-up costs of US$ 29 million, whereas preventing the
accident may have required less than US$ 6.6 million.7
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In addition to the humanitarian and socio-economic repercussions, poorly
managed ammunition also fuels insecurity. Diversion of ammunition 8 from
storage sites, and its onward proliferation, has been a catalyst for armed conflicts
in various regions of the world. In the wake of the uprising in Libya, weapons,
ammunition and explosives from looted and often-damaged Libyan stockpiles
have become key enablers of political instability, security volatility and violence.
They have reinforced the military capability of a number of non-State actors, from
West Africa to Syria.9 Also, diverted ammunition and explosives are increasingly
used to build improvised explosive devices (IEDs).10 The latter have become a
weapon of choice, especially of non-State actors, in many current conflicts,
including in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq or Syria. The harm caused by IEDs largely
affects civilians.11
These developments have underlined the relevance of safe and secure
management of conventional ammunition. In countries failing to identify and
dispose of surplus or unsafe stockpiles of ammunition, risks of unplanned
explosions and diversion are particularly elevated.12
Safe and secure ammunition management should not be comprehended as a
‘siloed’ set of technical activities, but rather as part of broader efforts towards
peaceful societies and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
for instance, as a means to reduce violence, curb illicit arms flows and increase
urban safety. It can also derive from and contribute to security sector governance
such as at the level of institutions, management processes and the security of
ammunition storage sites (see Figure 2).
In addition, ammunition management is a pathway towards sustaining peace,13
including as part of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). At
the same time, measures geared towards preventing diversion and the illicit
trafficking of ammunition and explosives are usually part of counter-terrorism
strategies.14 Finally, efforts to safely and securely manage ammunition contribute
to implementing arms embargoes, and strengthening compliance with arms
control and disarmament instruments.
While countries bear the primary responsibility for improving their management
of ammunition, a considerable number of them have been facing challenges to
do so effectively. In recent years, much effort has been made to address these
challenges with a particular focus on strengthening national management
practices. The ammunition issue has been increasingly discussed, gradually
creating a more conducive environment for countries to more openly engage.
The scale of requests for support – and the number of stakeholders involved – has
augmented as a result.15
Introduction, scope and methodology
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FIGURE 2
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The higher profile of unplanned explosions, recognition of diversion risks and
the increasing use of IEDs have elevated ammunition management as a priority.
This has also led to recent international normative developments. The adoption
by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) of the International Ammunition Technical
Guidelines (IATG) in 2011 was a landmark in this regard. It was followed by
the establishment of the UN knowledge management platform dedicated to
conventional ammunition (UN SaferGuard programme) overseeing IATG roll-out.
It is in this context that Switzerland launched the Safe and Secure Management
of Ammunition (SSMA) initiative and held two international meetings in 2015 and
2016.16 Similarly, the African Union (AU) adopted its regional Ammunition Safety
and Security Management initiative in 2017. The same year, the UNGA resolution
on ‘problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles
10
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in surplus’ established a multilateral platform for discussions on ammunition, with
a group of governmental experts (GGE) to be established by 2020.
This report will address the current state of play on safe and secure management of
ammunition by discussing the normative landscape surrounding it, implementation
at various levels, as well as key principles and challenges. It will also elaborate on
gaps and issues for further consideration. It rests on substantive desk research,
complemented by interviews with and/or questionnaire responses from major
relevant States and organisations.17

Introduction, scope and methodology
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NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS
AND PROCESSES ON
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT

NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS 18
International frameworks
At the request of the UNGA in 1997, a study assessed how enhanced controls
on ammunition and explosives can contribute to ‘preventing and reducing the
excessive and destabilising accumulation and proliferation of SALW [small arms
and light weapons]’.19 This brought the topic of ammunition prominently onto the
international agenda for the first time. Today, a wide range of instruments exist
that deal with ammunition in different ways, often within the context of SALW
control (see Table 1).
While the scope of the politically binding 2001 UN Programme of Action on Small
Arms (UN PoA) did not explicitly refer to ammunition, some controversy persists in
this regard.20 In fact, the outcome document of the 2016 UN PoA Biennial Meeting
of States includes references to risks (e.g. accidental explosions), investigative
methods (e.g. ballistics information) or activities (e.g. life-cycle management) that
are equally relevant to ammunition as to weapons.21 The forthcoming UN PoA
Third Review Conference is likely to hold a discussion on ammunition.
Other frameworks deal with provisions directly relevant to ammunition. The
first legally binding international instrument on small arms control, the 2001 UN
Firearms Protocol, places ammunition firmly in its provisions aimed at combatting
the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of ammunition. Relevant provisions are also
contained in the 2003 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) that encourages States Parties to take
generic preventive measures to minimise the occurrence of explosive remnants
of war, including through munitions management.22
A major addition to the ammunition management framework was added by the
2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The centerpiece of the treaty, i.e. prohibitions and
an export assessment procedure, apply to ammunition. Appropriate measures
that could be undertaken to mitigate risks of exported ammunition being used
to violate international law can include programmes, agreed between exporting
and importing States, to strengthen stockpile management capacities. Stockpile
management also features among areas for international cooperation and
assistance.23
Finally, the UN Security Council provides a further international legal framework
under which ammunition management may be addressed (see Box 1).

14
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BOX 1

ARMS EMBARGO ON THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

Through its resolution 2399 (2018), the UN Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, calls upon the CAR authorities to ensure the
collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked, or illicitly held
weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, the authorities are also encouraged
to increase their capacity to store and manage weapons and ammunition in
their possession according to international best practices and norms.24

Lastly, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development represents the global
political framework for the many significant interconnected challenges to
sustainable development of our times. Since 2016, countries have worked towards
the achievement of the SDGs. The latter represent an important framework
for ammunition management and its manifold ramifications. While improving
stockpile management is key to curbing illicit arms flows (SDG 16.4), it also helps
to prevent unplanned explosions, enabling at-risk countries to better protect
civilians (SDG 16.1), increase urban safety (SDG 11.7) and create an environment
that is conducive to sustainable development. The SDGs can also serve as a
vehicle for strengthening national institutions in charge of stockpile management
and promoting their effectiveness, accountability and transparency (SDG 16.6;
SDG 16.a).25 The importance of the SDGs in this context is echoed by the UNGA’s
call on States to consider ammunition management as an intrinsic part of their
actions for achieving the SDGs.26

Regional frameworks
Various regions of the world bear witness to a body of frameworks that address
the topic of ammunition in various forms and degrees of implementation (see
Table 1). In the Americas, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit
Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other
Related Materials (CIFTA) has set the benchmark since 1998, serving as a model
for the UN Firearms Protocol. The CARICOM region, suffering from a high level of
homicides, has adopted a crime and security strategy and declaration on SALW,
whereby States are committed to combatting the illicit trade of ammunition or
enhancing ammunition management.27

Normative frameworks and processes on ammunition management
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TABLE 1

SELECTED AMMUNITION-RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL
FRAMEWORKS (DETAILED IN ANNEX I)

Framework

Date

Legal status

Adoption Entry into
force

Legally
binding

Non-legally
binding

International
2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (universal adherence)

2015

ATT

2013

2014

•

CCW Protocol V

2003

2006

•

UN PoA (universal adherence)

2001

UN Firearms Protocol

2000

•

•
2005

•

Regional
CARICOM Crime and Security
Strategy

2013

•

Khartoum Declaration

2012

•

CARICOM Declaration on SALW

2011

•

ECCAS Convention
(Kinshasa Convention)

2010

2017

•

EU Council Common Position
2008/944/CFSP

2008

2008

•

ECOWAS Convention

2006

2009

•

EU Strategy to combat illicit
accumulation and trafficking of
SALW and their Ammunition

2005

Nairobi Protocol

2004

OSCE Document on Stockpiles
of Conventional Ammunition

2003

SADC Protocol

2001

Nadi Framework

2000

CIFTA

1997
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A particularly high number of frameworks have been developed on the African
continent, compared to other regions. The Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Protocol, adopted in 2001, was the first African regional
small arms agreement to become legally binding. It seeks to prevent, combat
and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related
materials, regulate the import and export of legal small arms, and harmonise
national legislation. It served as the basis for the 2004 Nairobi Protocol on the
prevention, control and reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes region and the
Horn of Africa.28
Another major instrument on the African continent is the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) 2006 Convention on SALW, their ammunition and
other related materials. ECOWAS member states committed to taking appropriate
steps to manage and secure government stocks of weapons and munitions, such
as by identifying surplus and obsolete stocks for disposal.29 Furthermore, in 2010,
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) adopted a legally
binding instrument, most commonly known as the Kinshasa Convention, which
establishes measures to control the production, trade and use of small arms.
Finally, in the 2012 non-legally binding Khartoum Declaration, States Parties are
committed to controlling SALW across the neighbouring countries of Western
Sudan, including through physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of
State-held SALW and ammunition.
In Europe, the 2003 Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition adopted
by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) represents the
major political framework applicable to all OSCE participating States to improve
stockpile management practice, particularly relating to assessing surplus items
and risk, and facilitating international cooperation and assistance. In the European
Union (EU), two major frameworks stand out: the EU Council Common Position
944, adopted in 2008, defining common rules governing the control of exports
of military technology and equipment, and the 2005 EU Strategy to combat illicit
accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, in particular in the
Sahel region.
In Asia and the Pacific region, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) created the political
Nadi framework (2000) to address the problem of illicit arms trafficking in the
region.30 Later in 2003, PIF adopted the Model Weapons Control Bill, which
includes standards on safe and secure storage.31 While SALW and ammunition
do not seem to have yet been dealt with in regional instruments in Asia, efforts in
this regard are currently ongoing (see Box 2).

Normative frameworks and processes on ammunition management
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BOX 2

EFFORTS BY THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS
(ASEAN) TO DEVELOP A LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT

Since 2015, Cambodia has been leading the efforts of the ASEAN, with
the support of the EU, to develop a legally binding instrument to tackle the
problems of illicit firearms trafficking. This initiative responds to a recognised
need that more should be done to address the security challenges in the
region. A possible instrument in the future may include provisions on SALW
ammunition, and on stockpile management and security.

This patchwork of international and regional frameworks, some of which differ in
their definition of ammunition,32 makes their effective implementation challenging.
The Small Arms Survey examined definitions, synergies and contradictions in
terms of stockpile management and diversion of SALW and ammunition across
the UN PoA, the ATT, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) and several regional
African instruments. It revealed a considerable overlap in the nature of stockpile
management measures required or recommended and inconsistency with regards
to surplus stocks or diversion prevention. More specifically, the ATT primarily deals
with diversion prevention during international transfers; the other instruments do
so during the life of a weapon.33 Better understanding on how the instruments link
to one another is the pre-condition to enhance the effectiveness of and synergies
across their implementation.

Norms and standards
The development of norms and standards in recent years is proof of the distinctive
nature of ammunition (see Annex II). One major development culminated in the
adoption of the IATG under the UN SaferGuard programme in 2011. Using a threetiered progressive risk reduction approach,34 these guidelines were developed
to assist countries in improving safety, security and efficiency in managing
ammunition throughout its life cycle.35 Based on good practices from around the
world, they are a solid foundation for developing national regulations and standard
operating procedures (SOPs) regarding ammunition management.
Efforts have been made to ensure that standards in the realm of arms control
and disarmament, although distinct in scope, are fully compatible with one
another. The IATG, for instance, were developed to complement the 2006 UN
Integrated DDR Standards and the International Small Arms Control Standards
(ISACS). Complementarities and similarities also exist between the IATG and
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The former are of relevance to
18
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mine action organisations for the storage, transport, logistics and disposal of
ammunition and provide guidance on explosive ordnance clearance of ammunition
storage sites after an explosion. Consequently, once the IATG came into effect, the
IMAS were reviewed so as to ensure consistency with these new requirements.36
At the regional level, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse
for the Control of SALW (SEESAC) has, since the early 2000s, contributed to
standard-setting in the form of its Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and
Guidelines that comprise standards on ammunition stockpile management or
ammunition storage and safety.37 Regional organisations have also codified
good practice to help implementation such as the OSCE’s Handbook of Best
Practices on Conventional Ammunition38, generic SOPs for stockpile management
and destruction of SALW by the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament
and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean or guidelines for the
implementation of the Nairobi Protocol by the Regional Centre on Small Arms
and Light Weapons. Noteworthy also are the manuals of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) on Safety Principles for the Storage of Military Ammunition
and Explosives and for Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives that
informed the drafting of the IATG.39 With the adoption of the IATG, there is a
clear reference point for any subsequent updates of these regional standards
and guidelines.

Normative frameworks and processes on ammunition management
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POLITICAL PROCESSES
In parallel to the elaboration of international and regional normative frameworks,
norms and standards, several political processes on ammunition management
have taken shape within and outside of a UN framework.
The UNGA has dedicated specific attention to ammunition since 1997 when it
requested a report on the problem of ammunition and explosives (mandated
notably under the agenda item on small arms).40 In 2004, the Assembly decided
to include on its agenda a stand-alone item related to conventional ammunition
stockpiles in surplus, while the open-ended working group to negotiate the ITI
also recommended that SALW ammunition be addressed in a comprehensive
manner as part of a separate process.41 Problems arising from the accumulation
of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus have since been addressed by
the UNGA periodically.42 In 2008, a GGE considered further steps to enhance
cooperation on the topic, which recommended the development of the IATG
and the set-up of a knowledge resource management platform on ammunition
technical issues (established later as the UN SaferGuard).43
The latest iteration of the biennial resolution adopted by the UNGA in December
2017 represents the culmination of that ammunition-specific process.44 This
resolution establishes open and informal consultations ‘with a view to identifying
urgent issues pertaining to the accumulation of conventional ammunition
stockpiles in surplus on which progress can be made’ that may build a basis for a
GGE to be convened for 2020.45

20
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Beyond this specific UN General Assembly ammunition-dedicated track, other UN
processes consider the effective management of ammunition, mostly in relation
to SALW.46 Since the advent of the UN’s process on small arms, ammunition
has come into play and been considered an integral part of SALW.47 In principle,
the UN Security Council treats small arms and ammunition in a comprehensive
manner when addressing country-specific and thematic items on its agenda.
For example, UN Security Council resolution 2220 (2015) recognises the value
of effective PSSM of SALW and ammunition as an important means to prevent
the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation and misuse of SALW, while also
emphasising the need for assistance to develop capacities.48 Since 2016,
ammunition management has also formed part of another UN process pertaining
to countering the threat posed by IEDs.49
Switzerland launched its SSMA initiative in 2015 outside of a UN context. This
initiative materialised in particular in the form of an informal open-ended Group
of Interested States in Geneva to discuss the topic regularly, as well as two
international meetings in 2015 and 2016. These meetings were a first attempt
to stimulate discussions among policy-practitioners and technical experts
aimed at exploring ammunition management implementation challenges and
identifying responses to address them. The Swiss initiative is appreciated for
having boosted attention for and generated political momentum around this
long-time neglected issue. This achievement has contributed to the strong
mandate for ammunition management-related work called for by the 2017
UNGA resolution on the topic.
Most recently, the AU adopted its Ammunition Safety and Security Management
initiative in 2017.50 In doing so, the AU acknowledges that ‘poorly secured and
managed Government arms and ammunition stockpiles remain a main source of
armaments for non-state armed groups, terrorist groups and criminals’, and urges
Member States to implement PSSM best practices.51 The initiative supports the
practical steps outlined in the AU master roadmap to ‘silence the guns’, while
seeking to complement assistance in beneficiary countries. As a first concrete
result of this initiative, Guinea-Bissau was supported in 2017, while other countries
including Malawi, Zambia, Angola or Mozambique, are considered for 2018
and beyond.

Normative frameworks and processes on ammunition management
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CHALLENGES IN AMMUNITION
MANAGEMENT EFFORTS

NATIONAL LEVEL
Immediate prevention measures are essential, not least to demonstrate positive
dividends and foster confidence in the process. But focus on short-term
interventions on physical security and ammunition and explosive management,
or stockpile accounting training has rarely been proven to be sufficient to address
the issue and ensure that knowledge and practices are sustained.52 The two
international meetings convened by Switzerland have clearly sharpened the
understanding among practitioners of step-by-step and consistent approaches
as well as sustainable solutions. Also, there is growing recognition that unplanned
explosions and diversion are symptoms of various shortcomings: lack of political
awareness, lack of staff capacity, skills and adequate infrastructure, or institutional,
governance and oversight issues.53

BOX 3

MOBILE TRAINING TEAM (MTT) PROJECT IN BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA

Set up in December 2010, the MTT project aims to develop capacity and
provide training on weapons and ammunition storage site management,
safety and security in the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through
a train-the-trainer approach.
Led by Switzerland and implemented jointly with Austria and Sweden, the
project has delivered sustainable results principally due to its multi-level and
holistic approach:
• While the project provides needs-based, tailor-made modular training,

it also ensures that knowledge and capacity are incrementally
transferred and institutionalised with increasing national responsibility
and autonomy;
• The MTT courses address the needs of armed forces personnel

working on different aspects of weapons and ammunition life-cycle
management, recognising that MTT training should be specific to local
dynamics, sensitive to the actual competencies and needs of recipients,
and based on an in-country assessment;
• The MTT project strives to ensure coherence between training and

equipment so that both aspects are delivered in accordance with
international standards;

24
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• Since building stockpile management capacity requires wider

institutional, structural, and organisational reforms, the project is
implemented as part of the Ammunition, Weapons and Explosives
Master Plan. Led by the Ministry of Defence and coordinated by the
EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Master Plan
combines a bottom–up approach to stockpile management with
top–down reform initiatives (involving, for instance, changes to force
structure, a country’s normative framework and personnel allocation).
The project is innovative in that it aims for strong coordination and coop
eration among donors commensurate with their national expertise.
Switzerland, for instance, leads on the physical security, management,
and transport of weapons and ammunition, Austria provides expertise
and training at various levels of ammunition management techniques and
Sweden, supporting Austria in ammunition training, focuses on the creation
of ammunition guides. Finally, the initial time frame to achieve the project’s
objectives was three to five years. It will now last until at least 2019. Project
partners do not consider that sustainable capacity development constitutes
a short-term endeavour. 54

Although achieving effective and sustainable national ammunition management is
a multi-layered and context-specific endeavour, efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(see Box 3) illustrate some of the following common key ingredients that have
emerged over the years:

National awareness and ownership
Many countries remain unaware of the risks associated with the consequences of
inadequate ammunition management practices and consider addressing them only
in the aftermath of an explosive event. At times, they also refrain from engaging
openly, in particular in regions characterised by political tensions. Ammunition
is more often perceived as an asset than a potential liability. Awareness can,
in certain contexts, be absent due to political, security or simply cultural and
language factors.
National ownership is a pre-requisite. Commitment at the top level of govern
ment does, however, not necessarily trickle down to those actually doing the
job on the ground. On occasion, implementing agencies are asked for support,
but once in country, cooperation from local storage holders is not guaranteed.
Challenges in ammunition management efforts
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Likewise, commitment may be found on the ground whilst lacking at the top level,
requiring that it be nurtured at all levels.55
Effective ammunition management is driven nationally and takes into account
country-specific situations.56 Engaging with countries on ammunition also
pre-supposes a high level of trust and confidence. As trust is necessarily built-up
over time, support to at-risk countries is a long-term endeavour. Conversely, regular
changes of personnel working for implementing partners and governmental
institutions can jeopardise that trust and the likelihood of at-risk countries to
engage actively.

National capacities and structures
The establishment of effective and well-coordinated national structures is a
concrete signal that ammunition management is nationally owned. Reality on
the ground, however, is that the ammunition portfolio often remains an ‘orphan’.

26
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Should such structures exist, for instance national SALW commissions, they often
lack sufficient authority and resources. As a result, when planning and conducting
their projects, external implementing partners tend to deal with various national
counterparts.57
Functioning structures and staff competencies are two sides of the same coin.
At-risk countries often lack capacity to recognise and address the issue. In practice,
the temptation for international stakeholders to seek immediate improvements
might result in a vicious cycle: a lack of national institutional capacity leading to
external material assistance and equipment that does, in turn, not address those
national gaps in the long term. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates how
to plan the development of skills and competencies from the beginning, in such a
manner that it leads to national uptake and capacities at all levels.

National plans with desired end-state
National action plans or strategies, developed by national authorities, are deemed
essential to set needs-based and context-specific national priorities and define an
end-state for international cooperation and assistance. Similarly, these plans help
identify synergies across ammunition-related areas as well as obstacles potentially
undermining sustainability.58

Applying the IATG at the national level
The development of a national normative and technical framework that is based
on the IATG is essential for sustainable national ownership and implementation,
taking into consideration the local context, needs and priorities. Certain national
norms are often already in place, but generally spread over several disciplines
associated with the management and storage of hazardous materials, and do not,
at times, reflect latest normative developments, or lack enforcement mechanisms.

UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS
The risks from poorly managed and unsecured ammunition, especially in volatile
security environments have been addressed in the mandates of UN missions.
Change, marking a watershed in the role of peacekeeping missions to address
these risks can, for instance, be attributed to UN Security Council resolution 2100
in 2013, explicitly calling on the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali (MINUSMA) to assist the transitional authorities, through training and other
support, in weapons and ammunition management.59 The role of UN missions in
supporting weapons and ammunition management practices, especially at the
Challenges in ammunition management efforts
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national level, has been further reiterated since several peacekeeping and special
political missions were mandated with ammunition management-relevant tasks
(see Figure 3).60

FIGURE 3

MAJOR CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING AND SPECIAL POLITICAL
MISSIONS COMPRISING AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITIES (DETAILED IN ANNEX III) 61
MINUSCA
Central African Republic

UNSMIL
Libya

UNAMID
Darfur
MINUSMA
Mali

MONUSCO
Dem. Rep. of the Congo

UNSOM
Somalia

UNMISS
South Sudan

UNISFA
Abyei
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Assistance by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as part of the
implementation of peacekeeping/special political mission mandates primarily
supports national capacity development, including the safe and secure
management of arms and ammunition stockpiles. UNMAS also provides relevant
technical advice to national authorities to support compliance with sanctions
regimes, when applicable.
Ammunition storage facilities of peacekeeping forces themselves represent a risk
in certain circumstances. The Small Arms Survey noted that ‘the loss of arms
and ammunition in peace operations is neither infrequent nor inconsequential.’62
Although the UN system for the management and control of the movement
of contingent-owned equipment provides for a rigorous stockpile security and
transport control regime, risk perception and stockpile security practices differ
from one mission to another, including among contingents of the same mission.63
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INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
In the last decade, PSSM has become a highly requested form of intervention to
curb illicit flows of SALW and ammunition. Significant international cooperation
and assistance of a technical and financial nature has been provided to at-risk
countries through a multiplicity of channels and by an array of actors.64
No global assistance mechanism or trust fund dedicated to ammunition
management currently exists, increasing the risk of duplicity and lack of coop
eration. In the absence of such, mine action, SALW control, stabilisation or security
sector reform portfolios have served as funding streams for ammunition work.
Furthermore, projects have been funded through thematic channels on regional
security and counter-terrorism or in the context of specific international and
regional instruments such as the ATT, UN PoA, CCW Protocol V or the ECOWAS
Convention, which all comprise a mechanism for international cooperation and
assistance. Some projects are also funded through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund
for Assistance in Mine Action, UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms
Regulation and potentially the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund.
Certain regional organisations also provide platforms for at-risk countries to
request support. As mentioned above, the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of
Conventional Ammunition entails an assistance mechanism through which
participating States can seek expert advice as well as financial and material
assistance for the improvement of their stockpile management. Similarly, through
its Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, NATO
supports projects in allied and partner countries in the realm of mine action, SALW
control and PSSM. It seems, however, that most support is provided bilaterally
including in the context of military-to-military cooperation.

Challenges in ammunition management efforts

|

29

As the wider humanitarian, stability and peacebuilding ramifications of ammunition
management have begun to complement the previously dominant security
perception, long-standing bilateral and multilateral military-to-military support
has been complemented by assistance from a civilian ‘community of practice’,
including donors, the United Nations, international, regional and non-governmental
organisations and commercial actors from different backgrounds.65
While ammunition management requires specific technical skills and competence,
expertise from various other sectors, such as mine action and SALW control, can
be drawn upon extensively.66 The former tends to perform mostly technical and
operational tasks, while the latter often conveys an understanding of the SALW
control context and wider policy frameworks.67 The involvement of organisations
with different expertise and background allows the overall response to be better
targeted and to achieve greater impact.68 This notwithstanding, this multistakeholder modus operandi brings challenges in ensuring that actors and projects
complement each other in a coordinated and coherent manner.
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GAPS AND ISSUES FOR
FURTHER CONSIDERATION

Analysing the interplay between instruments, processes and implementation
efforts highlights several avenues that deserve further attention:

Ensuring coherence across legal, political and operational responses
The previous chapter underlined the fact that the framework currently addressing
ammunition consists of a patchwork of instruments. As reflected at the 2017 OSCE
Ministerial Council, there is scope to bring regional regimes closer to international
developments to ensure more coherence.69
Furthermore, the various political initiatives, which culminated in the adoption
of the 2017 UNGA resolution on ammunition stockpiles in surplus, testify to a
heightened political momentum. However, it requires deliberate efforts to ensure
that they feed into one another in a truly coordinated and coherent manner.
The UN General Assembly ‘track’ coordinated by Germany may lead on political
work at the global level, clarifying further the state of play and current gaps,
recommending actions and potentially developing further the political framework
on the topic. It might address to a lesser extent ‘operational’ aspects, including
building national capacities, fostering research, exchanging good practices on
workable solutions, awareness-raising on the IATG, and matching needs with
resources. The latter, coupled with a regional perspective, has thus far been the
focus of the Swiss initiative and the more recent initiative by the AU.
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Strengthening capacities, institutions and standards
Incomplete understanding of ammunition management by national counterparts
often hampers the effectiveness and achievability of institutional, legislative
and operational changes from the outset. A mix of tailored ‘incentives’ must be
offered more convincingly to increase appreciation of the risks involved when
managing ammunition ineffectively and to foster awareness of the breadth of
measures an appropriate response entails. Greater awareness is required on the
accountability of national authorities for ammunition management. The risks of
unplanned explosions for civilians, including socio-economic impact, the threat of
regional insecurity or costs related to the maintenance of obsolete/unserviceable
stockpiles, are all dimensions that should be called to mind when engaging on this
topic at a political level, across State institutions (as opposed to only within the
Ministry of Defence and relevant departments of the armed forces).
Support is most effective when approached as a broader governance issue.
National institutions should be established, equipped and, crucially, empowered. A
certain lack of in-country know-how and related guidance regarding resources and
capacities required for an institution to sustainably manage ammunition appears
to be a major impediment in this regard. Comprehensive and long-term support,
linked to organisational structure, as well as ensuring strong capacities and the
appropriate decision-making power of such entities, must remain a priority,
which includes the development of skills and knowledge specific to stakeholder
groups at all levels. Importantly, sensitising and involving oversight bodies such
as parliaments should be encouraged.
Particular questions as to the set-up of such entities have arisen. Expanding the
mandate of an existing body, for example a national SALW commission or a mine
action authority, is an option that might allow ammunition management-related
tasks to be efficiently integrated into existing structures.70 Yet, these bodies
must imperatively be equipped with relevant ammunition expertise and enjoy
institutional backing from all national stakeholders, including the armed forces, in
order to be recognised and effective.
With a view to planning and guiding national ammunition management in a
strategic and sustainable manner, national action plans can play a cardinal role
in ownership and, by focusing on the national policy level, are key to overcoming
the slim divide between the normative processes (e.g. UN resolutions, guidelines)
and technical implementation. National action plans should also be understood
as a tool to prioritise efforts, coordinate and define objectives and ‘exit points’ to
which international partners can commit over the medium term. As important as
these plans are, further guidance is deemed useful and capacity development is
Gaps and issues for further consideration
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needed for their establishment in the future. The 2017 UNGA resolution related
to problems arising from the accumulation of ammunition stockpiles in surplus
encourages States to develop them.71
Finally, where legislation for ammunition exists, it rarely addresses the whole scope
of the issue. Familiarity with the IATG must be increased, including through further
translations, and capacities developed so that sound national regulations are put in
place. Some efforts are under way in this regard: the UN Office for Disarmament
Affairs (UNODA) and the GICHD are developing a guide on establishing national
standards for ammunition management, and a second one to serve as a ‘basic
guide’ to assist countries in best utilising the IATG in their national contexts.

Structuring international cooperation and assistance
Ammunition management is a relatively new issue in international cooperation
and assistance with an array of new actors becoming active. It requires further
consolidation and structuring to bring the different stakeholders together, harvest
thematic and institutional synergies across sectors, and nurture a common
understanding of the breadth of measures required and the different concepts
used. Better structuring of international cooperation and assistance, i.e. matching
needs with resources, and increasing coordination among donors is ever more
important. Not only because it could enhance the performance of international
cooperation, but also because it could set the basis for far clearer and better
conditions to build trust and confidence with national counterparts.
At the national level, it is undisputed that ammunition management is a State’s
own responsibility. In practical terms, a lack of national focal points in charge
of coordination seriously hampers coherent planning and implementation.72
However, cases such as Niger document that, in certain contexts, even an existing
national commission was not effectively involved in national planning; support
was instead coordinated bilaterally between donors and implementing partners.73
Examples such as Niger and Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrate, on the one hand,
the continuing need to promote more structured in-country coordination to help
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overcome the often fragmented responses. On the other hand, they also suggest
that partnership agreements need to be sought to ensure national financial and
political commitment for uptake and sustainability of international assistance.
Approaching ammunition management at the regional level has gained much
attention, mindful that the diversion and illicit proliferation of weapons and
ammunition is typically a regional challenge accentuated by porous borders.
Yet, regional approaches are not effective by and of themselves, but require a
strong regional arrangement. Certain regional organisations have traditionally
been engaged, while others have done so more recently (see Box 4). The AU,
for instance, has recognised the value of equipping itself with a roster of PSSM
experts from the Greater Sahel States to better respond to requests and broker
local training capacities across the region. Once operational and qualified, such
regional experts could complement the UN SaferGuard’s Roster of Experts.

BOX 4

AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT SUPPORT BY THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)

From 2010 to 2016, the OAS established and conducted a programme to
support Central American countries in different areas of SALW control and
ammunition management. Following international standards, the programme
resulted in the destruction of surplus/obsolete ammunition, accounting of
stockpiles, refurbishment of facilities and training in Costa Rica, Dominica or
El Salvador, among others. The programme has testified to the importance
of long-standing support and the role that a regional organisation can
play among countries in similar situations, including as a mechanism for
accountability. Serving as the Technical Secretariat of CIFTA gives the OAS a
privileged position in this regard.

Regional organisations can play a major role in channeling assistance and galvanising national buy-in and capacities, particularly in Africa and Europe. Partnerships in
Africa, primarily with the AU and ECOWAS, have been strengthened in the course
of the last few years. CARICOM and Central America have made good progress
as well. The active involvement of regional bodies on ammunition management seems more challenging in Asia and the Middle East; a focus on national
approaches in selected countries from these regions might be more realistic.
Work on issues such as national action plans or result-focused monitoring mechanisms are typically areas that could benefit from stronger regional collaboration in
the future.
Gaps and issues for further consideration
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A recurring challenge in international assistance is the development of sufficiently
detailed and ‘SMART’-ly formulated requests for support so as to make them
attractive to donors. This is an issue that the Small Arms Survey’s PSSM Priorities
Matrix attempts to address by offering a structured framework to requesting
countries to identify and rank priorities, and improve submissions.74
Finally, although coordination sensibly multiplies the impact of individual efforts,
mechanisms allowing for effective donor coordination have not kept up with the
speed at which support has grown, leading to inefficiencies and duplications.
This should be addressed at the international and/or regional level (see Box 5).
For its part, the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) was
originally conceived as an informal and apolitical platform for coordination of
assistance on PSSM (among other tasks),75 with a focus on information sharing.
It does not, however, fully respond to the need for an effective global forum for
donor coordination. Similarly, NATO’s SALW and mine action information-sharing
platform has value in listing SALW control, mine action and certain PSSM projects,
but is limited to those from NATO and Partnership for Peace countries willing to
share information on this tool.76

BOX 5

AFRICAN UNION-GERMANY COORDINATION PLATFORM
FOR THE GREATER SAHEL

In 2015, recognising the challenge of coordination, the AU together with
the German Federal Foreign Office, decided to set up a formal, structured
coordination platform in which the AU, donor representatives, relevant
regional economic commissions, States, the UN and implementing partners
meet bi-annually to share information about ongoing and future activities
on SALW control and PSSM in the Greater Sahel region. Technical working
groups have been active since, aiming to improve joint planning among
donors to enhance coordination, reduce duplication and ensure a balanced
distribution of assistance. An online database has also been requested to
capture SALW control and PSSM activities planned and undertaken in the
region.77 A roadmap for the implementation of the AU’s initiative ‘Silencing
the guns’ with a matching donor coordination structure is under development.
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Better anchoring of ammunition management in the ‘bigger picture’
Discussions in past years have revealed that ammunition management has
somewhat remained removed from disarmament, prevention, sustainable
development or humanitarian action and that these broader frameworks have not
been used sufficiently to change the still-prevailing perception that ammunition
management is a technical, independent activity.78 However, ammunition
management may yet unfold its true dividends, in particular when contributing
deliberately and coherently to broader peace and security efforts such as the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. Similarly, since it can reduce the risk of
proliferation, violence and crises, the UN Secretary-General’s prevention agenda
should be increasingly considered in this regard. A gap also persists between
ammunition management and wider urban planning; settlements around existing
ammunition depots or populations migrating to the vicinity of relocated depots are
key issues that can undermine the very objective of PSSM measures.
Finally, there is scope to approach ammunition management more consistently in
the context of normative frameworks. Related conferences such as the upcoming
Third Review Conference of the UN PoA or the Fourth Meeting of States Parties
to the ATT, offer opportunities to anchor ammunition management more firmly
in these discussions.

More results-focused ammunition management
From years of experience, the result is that by failing to understand the interconnec
tion between the various ingredients for sustainable ammunition management,
assistance has not reached its full possible impact.79 Symptomatically, the Small
Arms Survey noted in 2015 that the impact of stockpile management courses on
capacities and competencies was hard to evaluate.80
Many donors now increasingly consider their political and financial support
as an ‘investment’ which requires stakeholders to demonstrate their success
and impact. Doing so (or not) may determine future funding trends.81 To date,
ammunition management has remained, to a large extent, reliant on assumptions
on its impact that output-based, currently (and commonly) used measurements
(e.g. number of munitions destroyed or storage areas refurbished) are unable to
demonstrate.82 To address this gap, interventions should be better addressed as
part of a wider framework (see Box 6).

Gaps and issues for further consideration
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BOX 6

MEASURING PSSM ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE SDG FRAMEWORK

A workshop in 2016 undertaken by the Mines Advisory Group concluded
that implementation of SDG 16, specifically its target 16.4 to reduce illicit
arms flows, ‘provides a clear framework to consider the impact of PSSM
assistance’.83 Measuring progress towards this target can also be directly
relevant to the implementation of instruments such as the ATT and the UN
Firearms Protocol.84 Unsurprisingly, the UNGA encourages States to develop
ammunition management-specific indicators to complement their national
SDG frameworks.85

Similarly, the development of indicators to measure the impact and effectiveness of
assistance would allow for better capturing of sustainable change in systems and
approach, for instance regarding national normative frameworks, organisational
structures and procedures, training and doctrine development, equipment and
maintenance, personnel management, finances and infrastructure (i.e. the seven
conditions for comprehensive ammunition management).86
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Systematic ammunition management in UN missions
Ammunition management-related activities are enshrined in certain mandates of
UN peacekeeping and special political missions. Research for this report suggests
that they can be more systematically anchored in mandates, operationalised
and geared towards sustainable solutions. This may apply in particular to the
development of capacities of national stakeholders in PSSM and efforts towards
more structural and institutional efforts.87 Also, ammunition management could
warrant stronger focus (as opposed to weapons management). Ultimately,
further awareness and knowledge need to be raised among troop-contributing
countries (TCC), possibly, for instance, as part of pre-deployment training
guidelines. Changing risk perception, harmonising SOPs, regulating inspections,
storage requirements and inventory of TCC’s own weapons and ammunition, or
better standardising TCC’s mandates for the disposal of captured items could
reduce the loss of material, while strengthening the mission’s protection mandate
(see Box 7).

BOX 7

IMPROVING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT OF
THE AFRICAN UNION-UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN DARFUR (UNAMID)

UNAMID is a case in point to illustrate improved weapon and ammunition
management of a peacekeeping mission. UNMAS Darfur has assisted
UNAMID military and police contingents in upgrading or refurbishing storage
sites in accordance with the IATG and ISACS. It also helped establish an
ammunition and weapons working group to review the mission’s relevant
activities and draft a joint SOP for safe storage and management of weapons
and ammunition at UNAMID sites. The SOP is currently pending approval.88

Gaps and issues for further consideration
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CONCLUSIONS

In recent years, the issues arising from unsafe and unsecure management of
ammunition has been better documented and eventually understood as an area of
humanitarian and security concern. As a consequence, ammunition management
has been more firmly placed on the international agenda, at political and normative level, and a ‘community of practice’ has emerged. International support has
stepped up to strengthen national efforts.
Major bottlenecks persist for sound and sustainable ammunition management.
International cooperation and assistance is to be coordinated more effectively,
national capacities promoted and global awareness sustained. Beyond
its immediate human and national/regional security benefits, ammunition
management should also be better understood as a contribution to broader
efforts of prevention, peace, sustainable development and security sector
governance. Recent initiatives and processes such as the Germany-led
UN General Assembly track and the Swiss SSMA initiative are important
contributions in this endeavour.
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ANNEXES

ANNEX I: SELECTED AMMUNITION-RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS
FRAMEWORK

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

AMMUNITION ASPECT

• To end poverty, protect the planet and ensure
prosperity for all.

• Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates
everywhere.

International
2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (2015)

• Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows,
strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms
of organized crime.
• Other relevant targets.
Arms Trade Treaty (2013)

• To regulate the international trade in
conventional arms and seek to prevent
and eradicate illicit trade and diversion of
conventional arms by establishing international
standards governing arms transfers.

• Art. 3: Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system
to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by
the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions
of Article 6 (Prohibitions) and Article 7 (Export and Export Assessment) prior to
authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.
• Art. 16.1: In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek assistance
including legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity-building, and
technical, material or financial assistance. Such assistance may include stockpile
management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes,
model legislation, and effective practices for implementation. Each State Party
in a position to do so shall provide such assistance, upon request.

Protocol V on Explosive
Remnants of War to the UN
Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects (2003)

• To address post-conflict remedial measures
of a generic nature in order to minimize the
occurrence, effects and the risk of explosive
remnants of war.

UN Programme of Action to
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects (2001)

• To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit
trade in small arms and light weapons in all
its aspects.

44

|

Annexes

• Art. 9: Bearing in mind the different situations and capacities, each High
Contracting Party is encouraged to take generic preventive measures aimed
at minimising the occurrence of explosive remnants of war, including, but not
limited to, those referred to in Part 3 of the Technical Annex.
• Technical Annex, Part 3, Generic Preventive Measures: In order to ensure the
best possible long-term reliability of explosive ordnance, States are encouraged
to apply best practice norms and operating procedures with respect to its
storage, transport, field storage, and handling.
• The lack of definition of SALW in the UN PoA creates uncertainty as to whether
provisions that are not clearly limited to the weapons themselves, including
those in stockpile management, also apply to small arms ammunition, parts and
components. This has led to political controversy, with some States arguing that
the Programme of Action applies to ammunition and others rejecting this view.
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FRAMEWORK

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

AMMUNITION ASPECT

• To promote, facilitate and strengthen
cooperation among States Parties in order
to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms,
their parts and components and ammunition.

• Art. 4: This Protocol shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, to the
prevention of illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts
and components and ammunition and to the investigation and prosecution of
offences established in accordance with article 5 of this Protocol where those
offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group.

• To improve citizen security by creating
a safe, just and free Community, while
simultaneously improving the economic
viability of the Region.

• Strategy that fully takes ammunition into account.

• To strengthen cooperation and coordination
efforts in order to control the spread, flow,
misuse and illegal circulation of small arms
and light weapons.

• Commitment to strengthen national capacities and institutions to develop
and implement comprehensive SALW control strategies, national action plans and
interventions, including Physical Stockpile Security Management of State-held
SALW and ammunition, in accordance with international standards.

• To implement all necessary actions at the
national and regional level to fully combat
the illicit trade in small arms and light
weapons and their ammunition […].

• Declaration that fully takes ammunition into account.

• To prevent, combat and eradicate,
in Central Africa, the illicit trade and
trafficking in small arms and light weapons,
their ammunition and all parts and
components that can be used for their
manufacture, repair and assembly.

• Convention that fully takes ammunition into account.

• To define common rules governing
control of exports of military technology
and equipment.

• Common Position that fully takes ammunition into account
(as defined by the Common Military List of the European Union).

International (cont.)
UN Protocol against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, their
Parts and Components and
Ammunition (2001)

Regional
CARICOM Crime and Security
Strategy (2013)

Khartoum Declaration on
the Control of Small Arms
and Light Weapons across
the Neighboring Countries
of Western Sudan (2012)
CARICOM Declaration
on Small Arms and Light
Weapons (2011)

Central African Convention
for the Control of Small Arms
and Light Weapons, their
Ammunition and All Parts and
Components That Can Be Used
for Their Manufacture, Repair
and Assembly (2010)
European Union Council
Common Position 2008/944
of 8 December 2008 defining
common rules governing control
of exports of military technology
and equipment (2008)
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FRAMEWORK

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

AMMUNITION ASPECT

Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS)
Convention on Small Arms
and Light Weapons, Their
Ammunition and Other Related
Materials (2006)

• To prevent and combat the excessive and
destabilising accumulation of small arms and
light weapons within ECOWAS.

• Convention that fully takes ammunition into account.

European Union Strategy to combat
illicit accumulation and trafficking
of SALW and their ammunition (2005)

• To combat the accumulation of and illicit trade
in small arms and light weapons and their
ammunition.

• Strategy that fully takes ammunition into account.

Nairobi Protocol for the
Prevention, Control and
Reduction of Small Arms and
Light Weapons in the Great
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa
and Bordering States (2004)

• To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit
manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession
and use of small arms and light weapons in
the sub-region.

• Commitment to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of,
excessive and destabilising accumulation of, trafficking in, illicit possession
and use of small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and other related
materials, owing to the harmful effects of these activities on the security of
each state and the sub-region and the danger they pose to the well-being
of the population in the sub-region, their social and economic development
and their right to live in peace.

Regional (cont.)

• To continue the efforts for the control of small
arms and light weapons within ECOWAS […].

• To prevent the excessive and destabilising
accumulation of small arms and light weapons
in the sub-region.
• To promote and facilitate information
sharing and cooperation between the
governments in the sub-region, as well as
between governments, inter-governmental
organisations and civil society, in all matters
relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation
of small arms and light weapons […].

Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe
Document on Stockpiles of
Conventional Ammunition (2003)

• To provide participating States, upon their
request, with a procedure that is designed to
facilitate the assessment of situations created
by conventional ammunition, explosive
material and/or detonating devices presenting
risks on their territory and to establish a
framework for international assistance
(technical, personnel and/or financial) to
address these risks.

• Document that fully takes ammunition into account.

• To assist host and assisting/donor States’
efforts to deal with stockpile management,
stockpile security, and risk assessment of
conventional ammunition, explosive material
and detonating devices in surplus and/or
awaiting destruction […].
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FRAMEWORK

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

AMMUNITION ASPECT

• To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit
manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and
other related material, and their excessive
and destabilising accumulation, trafficking,
possession and use.

• Protocol that fully takes ammunition into account.

Regional (cont.)
Protocol on the Control of
Firearms, Ammunition and other
related materials in the Southern
African Development Community
(SADC) Region (2001)

• To promote and facilitate cooperation and
exchange of information and experience in
the Region to prevent, combat, and eradicate
the illicit manufacturing of, excessive and
destabilising use and accumulation of,
trafficking in, possession and use of firearms,
ammunition and other related materials.
• To cooperate closely at the regional level
as well as at international fora to effectively
prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit
manufacturing of, excessive and destabilising
use and accumulation of, trafficking in,
possession and use of firearms, ammunition
and other related materials in collaboration
with international partners.
Nadi Framework (2000)

• To require each person who possesses or uses
a firearm, ammunition, other related materials
and prohibited weapons under the authority
of a permit to have a genuine reason for the
possession/use of the weapon.

• Framework that fully takes ammunition into account.

• To provide strict requirements that must be
satisfied in relation to the possession and
use of firearms, ammunition, other related
materials and prohibited weapons.
Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturing
of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives,
and Other Related Materials (1997)
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• To prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms,
ammunition, explosives, and other related
materials.

• Convention that fully takes ammunition into account.

• To promote and facilitate cooperation and
exchange of information and experience
among States Parties to prevent, combat,
and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and
trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives,
and other related materials.
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ANNEX II: SELECTED AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT-RELEVANT
NORMS, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES
NORM/STANDARD/GUIDELINE

RELEVANT FOCUS

International
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 10.50 – Storage,
transportation and handling of explosives (2013)

• To provide national mine action authorities and demining organisations
with guidance on the safe storage, transportation and handling of explosives
and explosive materials both in the operators’ main base and also in the field or
temporary base.
• Specifications for the storage of explosives and safety distances when storing bulk
explosives are those provided by the IATG.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 11.20 – Principles and
procedures for open burning and open detonation operations (2013)

• To explain the principles and procedures for the conduct of large-scale open
burning and open detonation destruction of stockpiles of explosive ordnance
including anti-personnel mines. This IMAS includes recommendations for the layout
of disposal sites and the contents of SOPs in order to ensure a safe system of work.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 11.30 – National planning
guidelines for stockpile destruction (2013)

• To establish principles and provide guidance for the effective national planning and
management of stockpile destruction operations of explosive ordnance including
anti-personnel mines.

International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (2011)

• To achieve and demonstrate effective levels of safety and security of ammunition
stockpiles.
• To provide a comprehensive set of guidelines for the safe and secure storage
of conventional ammunition.
• To assist States to establish national standards and national SOPs by establishing
a frame of reference, which can be used, or adapted for use, as a national standard.

Regional
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) generic
standard operating procedures for stockpile management and
destruction of small arms and light weapons (2013)

• To assist States in their compliance with international agreements and norms,
while providing them with specific guidance that can be easily adapted to their
own administrative and operational systems.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition (2008)

• To serve as a guide for national policymaking by the OSCE participating States
and encourage higher common standards.
• Compilation of the currently available ‘best practice’ guides of techniques and
procedures for the destruction of conventional ammunition, explosive material and
detonation devices and the management and control of stockpiles of ammunition.
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NORM/STANDARD/GUIDELINE

RELEVANT FOCUS

Regional (cont.)
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). Regional Micro-Disarmament
Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) 05.40 – Ammunition and Explosives
Storage and Safety (2006)

• To provide specifications and guidelines for the safe storage, transportation
and handling of ammunition and explosives that are either: 1) recovered
during SALW collection operations; 2) awaiting destruction; or 3) are surplus
in storage.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). Regional Micro-Disarmament
Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) 05.50 – Ammunition and Explosives
Stockpile Management (2006)

• To provide specifications and guidelines for the stockpile management of
ammunition and explosives that are either: 1) recovered during SALW collection
operations; 2) awaiting destruction; 3) national stockpiles; or 4) are surplus
in storage.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Manual of NATO Safety
Principles for the Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives
(AASTP-1) (2006)

• To establish safety principles to be used as a guide between host countries and
NATO forces in the development of mutually agreeable regulations for the layout
of ammunition storage depots and for the storage of conventional ammunition and
explosives therein. These principles are intended also to form the basis of national
regulations as far as possible.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Manual of NATO Safety
Principles for the Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives
(AASTP-2) (2005)

• To establish safety principles and procedures to be used by NATO forces
in host countries during the transport of conventional military ammunition and
explosives by all modes of transport.

Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi
Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and
Light Weapons (2005)

• To elaborate a framework for the development of policy, review of national
legislation, general operational guidelines and procedures on all aspects of SALW,
required for implementation by the Nairobi Protocol.
• The guide covers the SALW stockpile, in legal non-State possession, as well as
that in State possession during peacetime.
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ANNEX III: MAJOR CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING
AND SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS COMPRISING
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
UN MISSION

AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES

AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

Deeply concerned by the proliferation of arms, in particular SALW and the use of such
arms against civilians, the UN Security Council calls for the implementation of the
arms embargo.95 UNMAS carries out weapon and ammunition safety management
initiatives with national security actors to help reduce the potential theft of small arms
and ammunition and mitigate the risk of unplanned explosions at storage facilities.
The Ordnance Disposal Office also provides technical support to UNAMID Military
and Formed Police Units to support compliance with International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines.96

UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

As a component of UNSOM, UNMAS supports the government in weapons and
ammunition management in line with sanctions obligations under the partial lifting
of the arms embargo.102

UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)

UN Security Council resolution 2386 (2017) affirms that ‘UNISFA may undertake
weapons confiscation and destruction in the Abyei.’97 UNMAS manages disposal
of confiscated weapons and ammunition. UNMAS also trains UNISFA troops in the
use of the equipment, to meet international standards in weapons and ammunition
destruction.98

UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

UNMAS has been supporting UNMISS since the beginning of 2017 by ensuring the
high quality required of ammunition and explosive storage facilities of the Troop
and Police Contributing Contingents (TCC/PCC) throughout the mission. This has
included site surveys at TCC/PCC storage facilities and, where necessary, supporting
these TCC/PCC to upgrade the security of their facilities. These tasks derive from the
UN Security Council’s mandate to UNMISS on the protection of civilians.99

UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali (MINUSMA)

UN Security Council resolution 2364 (2017) calls on the UN to ‘assist the Malian
authorities with (…) weapons and ammunition management’,89 prioritising the
enhancement of national capacities. While 22 weapons and ammunition facilities
have been constructed or rehabilitated in northern Mali up to 2017, efforts were
made for the Malian counterparts responsible for the newly rehabilitated storage sites
to receive tailored induction trainings on weapons and ammunition management.
Other qualifying training has also been conducted.90
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UN MISSION

AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES

UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)

The UN Security Council calls on MINUSCA to ‘actively seize, confiscate and destroy,
as appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of armed elements (…), to destroy, as
appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of disarmed combatants’ and to collect
and/or destroy surplus, seized, unmarked, or illicitly held weapons and ammunition.93
Beyond implementing a weapons and ammunition management framework, UNMAS
builds stockpile management capacity and supports disposal of unsafe weapons and
ammunition collected during DDR. UNMAS also facilitates the delivery of technical
assistance to the National Commission on SALW.94

UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

UN Security Council resolution 2348 (2017) ‘calls for continued national efforts to
address the threat posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse
of small arms and light weapons, including inter alia through ensuring the safe and
effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons and
ammunition, with the continued support of MONUSCO (…)’.91 UNMAS establishes
weapons and ammunition depots, provides training on their management and also
supports the government in developing a national action plan on SALW aiming to
reduce the risks related to the proliferation of weapons and ammunition.92

UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

The UN Security Council mandated UNSMIL to provide ‘support for securing
uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering their proliferation’, while
underscoring the importance of fully implementing existing sanctions measures.100
In this context, UNMAS has recently developed a technical framework for arms and
ammunition management to help national institutions manage vast stockpiles of
controlled and uncontrolled arms.101
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